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J PThe question of how to evaluate lost consumer surplus in beneﬁtcost analyses has been
contentious. There are clear health beneﬁts of regulations that curb consumption of goods with
health risks, such as tobacco products and foods high in fats, calories, sugar, and sodium. Yet, if
regulations cause consumers to give up goods they like, the health beneﬁts they experience may be
offset by some utility loss, which beneﬁtcost analyses of regulations need to take into account. This
paper lays out the complications of measuring beneﬁts of regulations aiming to curb consumption of
addictive and habitual goods, rooted in the fact that consumers’ observed demand for such goods
may not be in line with their true preferences. Focusing on the important case of tobacco products,
the paper describes four possible approaches for estimating beneﬁts when consumers’ preferences
may not be aligned with their behavior, and identiﬁes one as having the best feasibility for use in
applied beneﬁtcost analyses in the near term.
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Medicine. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).IntroductionConsumption of certain addictive and habituallyconsumed goods entails signiﬁcant harms topublic health. Some 42.1 million adults smoke
cigarettes.1 One third of U.S. adults are obese, and one
third have high blood pressure, reﬂecting diets high in
calories, fat, sugar, and sodium and lifestyles low in
exercise.2,3 Regulations aiming to bring consumption of
addictive and habitual goods down to levels consistent
with maintaining good health can have substantial health
beneﬁts. Yet, consumers may also lose some satisfaction
from their consumption if they cut back on goods they
especially like. Beneﬁtcost analyses of new federal
regulations, such as those put forth by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), are expected to analyzepartment of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge,
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consumers, as well as on businesses and government.4
This makes it important to examine the extent to which
health beneﬁts of regulations that reduce consumption of
addictive or habitual goods may be offset by lost utility.
For standard consumer goods, methods of measuring
lost utility in welfare analyses are well established. When
people’s consumption choices are in line with their
preferences and reﬂect accurate information about a good’s
attributes, the quantities of the good they buy and the
prices they are willing to pay contain full information
about how their utility would change if their consumption
fell. In this case, economists expect that regulations shifting
consumers away from their preferred consumption choices
will usually make them worse off. Because the prices they
pay and quantities of the good they buy reﬂect the value
they receive from it, this information can be used to
quantify the utility loss they experience if a regulation
causes them to reduce their consumption of the good.
For goods like tobacco products and alcohol, however,
the standard approach can be misleading, for two
reasons. First, consumption of these goods has spillover
effects on others, such as secondhand smoke, risks of
ﬁres, extra litter, and drunk-driving accidents. Thus,
using information from observed demand for the good
would mis-state its social value, because prices paid by
those who consume it overlook the costs that their
consumption imposes on others. A large literatureer Inc. on behalf of American Journal of Preventive Medicine. This
-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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analysis.5-7
Second, with consumption of health-harming addic-
tive and habitual goods, a number of “internalities” may
compound the traditional problem of externalities.8,9
Consumers may overweight the short-run costs of
reducing consumption relative to the long-run beneﬁts;
as a result, they may recurrently postpone reducing their
consumption, even if they want to cut back.10 They may
hold inaccurate beliefs about how easy it will be for them
to reduce their consumption in the future or the extent to
which health risks apply to them.11 For addictive goods
like cigarettes, they may have started smoking and
become addicted when they were young, before they
had full ability to balance beneﬁts, costs, and risks of their
decisions.12 Thus, even if they now choose their con-
sumption levels in a reasoned way, this is conditional on
having “addicted preferences” they may regret ever
having acquired.13 Such internalities cause people’s will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for the product to overstate the
value they receive from it.
Although these problems are well recognized in the
research literature, methods for taking them into account in
beneﬁtcost analysis are only beginning to be developed.
Recent beneﬁtcost analyses from the FDA have
attempted to estimate utility offsets to health beneﬁts from
reducing smoking, using the cigarette smoking model of
Gruber and Köszegi,10 in which smokers have time-
inconsistent preferences. Calibrations of this model show
the gap between how much people smoke and how much
they would prefer to smoke to be large, but also to imply
that smokers receive signiﬁcant utility from smoking.14
Thus, FDA’s beneﬁtcost analysis of a rule requiring
graphic warning labels to be added to cigarette packs took
lost utility to be between 10% and 90% of the health
beneﬁts, with 50% used as the primary estimate.15 Its
preliminary analysis of a proposed rule deeming non-
cigarette tobacco products to be subject to its regulatory
authority assumed utility losses would offset 70% of the
rule’s health beneﬁts.16 Similarly, its analysis of a rule
requiring nutrition information to be included in restaurant
menus said utility offsets could be between 0% and 100% of
health beneﬁts, depending on how vigorously people
shifted away from foods they like to less-preferred
options.17 Offsets of these magnitudes have been
criticized,18 and debates about appropriate ways of account-
ing for lost utility in beneﬁtcost analysis remain unsettled.
To advance thinking in this area, the Ofﬁce of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the
U.S. DHHS initiated a year-long project undertaken by
the authors, which included literature reviews, discus-
sions with prominent health and behavioral economists,
and original research on possible approaches. The projectMay 2016considered strengths and weakness of alternative
approaches for measuring utility losses in regulations
affecting addictive and habitual goods, with concerns for
both conceptual grounding and empirical feasibility.19
The intention was to identify approaches that could be
used in the beneﬁtcost work of FDA and other DHHS
agencies in the near-term. Focusing on the important
case of tobacco products, this paper gives an overview of
the issues and potential approaches considered, and
describes the approach that has the best potential for
immediate use in beneﬁtcost analysis.
Conceptual Issues
Figure 1 summarizes potential beneﬁts and costs of
regulations affecting addictive or habitual goods that harm
the consumer’s health. Although economic analysis makes
no sharp distinction between addictive and habitual goods,
medical and scientiﬁc research understands addiction to
be a brain-based disease involving compulsive seeking and
use of the product despite harmful consequences, as well
as tolerance, psychoactive affects, and withdrawal.20,21 As
the paper’s concern is with methods for measuring utility
offsets, the analysis is conﬁned to individuals who con-
sume or may start consuming the good; effects for these
two groups are shown in the left- and right-hand panels of
Figure 1, respectively. As mentioned, effects of regulations
on people who do not consume the good can be
considerable (as when tobacco regulations reduce non-
smokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke), but these are
beyond the current paper’s scope.
The primary purpose of regulations addressing addic-
tive and habitual goods is generally to reduce morbidity
and mortality from their consumption. Existing research
can often be used to project how a regulation’s provisions
will affect consumption of the good or goods at issue.
Then, evidence from medical and public health research
can be used to estimate effects on morbidity and mortal-
ity. Well-established methods can then be used to value
the rule’s expected health beneﬁts in monetary terms.22
And yet, other effects of the regulation may augment
or offset the health gains. On the plus side, people who
cut back their consumption of the good or who are
deterred from starting to use it save money that can now
be spent on other goods. For existing users who quit,
their self-esteem or sense of self-efﬁcacy may improve
from having overcome an addiction, or they may feel less
social stigma from having gotten rid of a bad habit. On
the negative side, when existing users cut back their
consumption, their quality of life may deteriorate as they
go through withdrawal or adjust their habits.19 Though
this sort of loss should be time delimited, some existing
users who stop consuming the good may experience
Figure 1. Effects of a regulation on existing users who reduce their consumption of
a health-harming addictive good and potential users deterred from initiating.
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of a consumption bundle that excludes the good as one
that had it in. Although some observers have argued that
the utility losses of existing users should not be counted
as effects of the rule if they became addicted to it while
young,23 the preferences they now act upon have been
reshaped by their addiction, so withdrawal costs they
experience from reducing their consumption of the good
are a real cost.
Whether potential users who are deterred from start-
ing to use an addictive or habitual good experience any
utility loss is less clear.8,19 If preferences are ﬁxed over
time, those deterred from initiating will suffer lost utility.
However, many addictive and habitual goods have the
property that use of the good itself changes preferences.
For example, the strong “taste” for cigarettes generally
grows out of having become addicted to cigarettes.21
Thus, people who do not start consuming the good will
not value it as highly as current users. If the average
person deterred from starting to smoke ﬁnds a con-
sumption bundle without cigarettes to be no less satisfy-
ing than one that includes them, a regulation that deters
them from starting to smoke will cause no utility loss.8
Although cigarettes and drugs such as heroin are likely at
one extreme in terms of tastes growing with use, this may not
be the case for all addictive and habitual goods. For goods like
alcoholic beverages, where many consumers are not addicted
and drink moderately, for example, potential users may get
less utility if they do not consume the good. But in cases
where addiction ﬁgures centrally in current users’ demand for
the good, it seems likely that utility losses from deterring
initiationwill be small or negligible comparedwith those fromreducing consumption among existing
users. This underlines the importance
of analyzing utility offsets of regula-
tions separately for potential and exist-
ing users.
Finally, in some cases, people may
substitute out of one good with
health harms into another “con-
sumption bad,” such as if a regulation
causes people to curb their consump-
tion of cigarettes but some switch
over to smoking small cigars.24,25
To incorporate nonhealth items
into measurement of beneﬁts, two
strategies are possible. The ﬁrst devises
a method of measuring the rule’s total
beneﬁts to consumers without explic-
itly breaking out the health and non-
health items. For example, a survey-
based or experimental research projectcould be used to elicit information onwhat consumers would
be willing to pay for a regulation’s provisions in toto. The
second estimates the value of the health and monetary
beneﬁts of the regulation, then ﬁnds ways of valuing the
other items. A disadvantage of the ﬁrst approach is that, if
problems of misvaluation partly explain why people over-
consume addictive and habitual goods, the same problems
may affect valuations of a regulation’s beneﬁts elicited from
consumers. For this reason, the second strategy of estimating
health beneﬁts and utility offsets separately may be the best
option.
The remainder of this paper discusses the advantages
and limitations of four possible approaches for estimating
beneﬁts to consumers of regulations, taking the possibility
of utility offsets into account: WTP for cessation, directly
measuring changes in subjective well-being, structural
approaches to calibrating utility, and use of rational
benchmarks for valuing beneﬁts. It is worth noting that
aspects of different approaches can be used in combina-
tion; for example, Ashley et al.14 used a rational benchmark
approach conceptually, but used an estimate from struc-
tural study to quantify utility offsets. The discussion gives
special attention to the case of tobacco products, as the new
regulatory authorities that FDA received under the 2009
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
imply a substantial new need to advance methods of doing
beneﬁtcost analyses for addictive and habitual goods.
Possible Approaches
Willingness to Pay for Cessation
In line with the idea of measuring the total beneﬁt of a
regulation, a number of studies have estimated existingwww.ajpmonline.org
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recovered either by using preference elicitation methods
or experiments to collect information on how consumers
value products (real or hypothetical) that increase their
odds of quitting, or by using information from prices and
usage of cessation products to back out “revealed” WTP.
For cigarette smoking, there are many products available
that improve smokers’ odds of quitting; these include
nicotine-replacement products (patches, lozenges, gum),
prescription medications (Chantix and Zyban), counsel-
ing, and combinations of these. Products that promote
weight loss include membership in support groups,
supervised diets, dietary supplements, and gastric bypass
surgery.26
The intuition of the WTP approach is as follows. If
consumers are found to be willing to pay W dollars for
the cessation product, the beneﬁt they expect to receive
from using the product must equal or exceed this cost.
The product’s expected beneﬁt is the increase in the
probability of cessation it provides over unassisted
quitting, Δp, times the value the user perceives of
quitting, V. The latter should be the present discounted
value of health and ﬁnancial gains of quitting, net
of utility losses. Purchasing the product implies
ΔpVZW. Then, from information on Δp and W, the
lower bound of V can be inferred to be W/Δp.
Several studies of the value of smoking cessation have
made use of this approach. Paterson and colleagues27
collected survey data on smokers’ WTP for smoking-
cessation options delivering various increases in proba-
bilities of quitting over a 1.5% baseline, ﬁnding values of
cessation between $750 and $3,200 (Canadian). Based on
an RCT, Schaufﬂer et al.28 estimated that smokers were
willing to pay $320 for a product that would increase
their odds of quitting by 5 percentage points, implying a
value of cessation of $6,400. Volpp and colleagues29
considered the impact of ﬁnancial incentives to stop
smoking using an RCT in which members of a treatment
group received up to $750 to quit smoking. The ﬁnding
that the probability of sustained abstinence was about 10
percentage points higher for the treatment group implies
a value of quitting of about $7,500.
These estimates seem implausibly low relative to
monetary values of the health beneﬁts of quitting—which
are often in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.8
Possibly this means that utility offsets to health beneﬁts
are indeed very large. But, equally possible is that the
same misvaluation issues that cause people to smoke
when they would prefer not to also affect their WTP for
cessation. For example, if smokers believe it is not hard to
quit on their own, or if they doubt that smoking-
cessation products do much to increase their odds of
quitting, their WTP for such products may be low. Thus,May 2016additional research aiming to capture measures of WTP
that are not biased down by informational, expectational,
or valuation issues is needed before the approach can be
reliably used in beneﬁtcost work.Direct Measurement of Subjective Well-Being
A second approach is to measure what happens to
people’s subjective well-being when they stop consuming
an addictive or habitual good. Subjective well-being can
be measured using single comprehensive questions (How
satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole right now?) or
indexes that cover multiple dimensions of people’s lives.
If changes in self-reported well-being can be interpreted
as changes in “experienced utility,” this method can give
direct insights into how people’s utility changes after
reducing consumption of an addictive or habitual good.
In principle, measured changes in well-being can be
converted into monetary values by estimating the change
in income that provides the same change in subjective
well-being as the event of interest. An important
advantage of this approach is that it is agnostic about the
sign of the utility change; curbing consumption of the
addictive or habitual good could increase or decrease utility.
A growing body of work examines the relationship
between smoking and subjective well-being.30,31 Piper
et al.32 tracked smokers who quit and others who
continued to smoke over a 3-year period. They found
that various measures of former smokers’ well-being rose
after they quit, relative to those who continued to smoke,
and none of them declined. Weinhold and Chaloupka
have a similar ﬁnding for Dutch smokers (D Weinhold
and F Chaloupka, London School of Economics, unpub-
lished observations, 2014). Contrary to perceptions that
quitting smoking could erode people’s ability to manage
anxiety, depression, or stress, a meta-analysis of 26
studies found smokers who quit to have fewer symptoms
of depression, anxiety, and stress and improved positive
mood and quality of life compared with people who
continued to smoke.33 This body of research supports the
idea that smoking cessation has important nonhealth
beneﬁts.
As intriguing as these ﬁndings are, some important
questions remain about their relevance to beneﬁtcost
analysis. First, measures of well-being used in existing
research may or may not differentiate between improve-
ments from better health versus other changes. Esti-
mates of health beneﬁts in beneﬁtcost analyses may
already include gains from improved health-related
quality of life, so subjective well-being information has
to be used in a way that avoids double counting. Second,
turning quantiﬁed measures of changes in subjective
well-being into monetary values is not straightforward,
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important for comparing beneﬁts to consumers to costs
borne by industry and government. Finally, it is not
clear whether ﬁndings for smokers who quit on their
own will be representative of outcomes for smokers who
quit as a result of regulation, as the former may quit
because their utility gains from quitting are relatively
high (or utility losses are relatively low). Only one study
has examined the impact of policy-induced changes in
smoking on subjective well-being. Gruber and Mullai-
nathan34 ﬁnd that higher cigarette excise taxes are
associated with increased happiness among those with
a propensity to smoke in the U.S. and Canada; because
higher taxes are known to promote quitting, this ﬁnding
suggests that smokers are happier after they quit even if
a policy change is part of what prompts them to quit. In
general, the promise of this approach will likely improve
in the years ahead, as the science of analyzing policies
using subjective well-being progresses.35Structural Approaches
The structural approach takes an explicit or “structural”
economic model of addictive consumption that incorpo-
rates features that cause divergences between people’s
behavior and their preferences (e.g., time inconsistency,
inaccurate expectations, among others). Then, calibra-
tion of the model is used to quantify the difference
between utility with and without regulation. This is the
approach of Gruber and Köszegi10 that is drawn on
by FDA15,16 and further developed in Ashley and
colleagues.14
Clear advantages of this approach are theoretical rigor
and solid foundation in welfare analysis.36,37 Yet, the
approach has several problems that limit its use in
applied analyses. Current models of addictive consump-
tion are highly stylized and not usually intended as
realistic representations of addictive or habitual con-
sumption.10,38,39 Models often explore a single, speciﬁc
departure from the standard model, rather than allowing
for multiple possible departures.
Finally, conclusions from structural models can be
very sensitive to choice of parameter values used for
calibrations. As a notable example, in the model of
Gruber and Köszegi,10 the hyperbolic discount factor β
drives the estimate of the extent of overconsumption. If
smokers are not hyperbolic at all (β¼1), their behavior
correctly reﬂects their preferences, and they do not
overconsume. If they are fully hyperbolic (β¼0) and
naïve about their ability to constrain themselves, their
smoking decisions do not reﬂect adverse health effects at
all. Values in between imply offsets in between these
extremes. A general consensus is that the average β in thepopulation is about 0.7.40 But, there is enormous
variation across studies, with estimates as low41 as 0.4
and as high42 as 0.9. Studies ﬁnd considerable hetero-
geneity in β within the population as well, with relatively
low values for current smokers, problem gamblers, and
children.43 Given the extent of this uncertainty, the
model implies such a wide range of possible utility offsets
as to be noninformative about the degree of overcon-
sumption. As such, more work needs to be done to
develop and test structural models before they can be
used in applied policy analysis.Rational Benchmark
The ﬁnal “rational benchmark” approach identiﬁes con-
sumers most likely to be well informed and to choose
their consumption levels in ways that rationally weigh
costs, beneﬁts, and risks, then uses the values these
consumers place on consumption to estimate losses in
utility that may result from regulations. The Australian
Productivity Commission used this approach to analyze
the beneﬁts of policies affecting gambling.44 Distinguish-
ing between “recreational” and “problem” gamblers, they
took the gambling behavior of the recreational group to
reﬂect how people would gamble if they had no gap
between their behavior and preferences; the difference
between the amount of gambling they actually do and the
amount they would do if they only gambled recreation-
ally then reﬂects the extent of their overconsumption.
Weimer et al.9 apply a similar framework to cigarette
smokers, estimating the beneﬁts of tobacco regulations
using a contingent valuation survey to elicit smokers’
preferences. They take smokers low on a measure of self-
reported addiction to be representative of a nonaddicted
demand curve. Ashley and colleagues14 make a similar
argument conceptually. In a retrospective analysis of
beneﬁts of antismoking policies, Jin et al.45 use college-
educated smokers aged 3045 years as an approximation
for the rational group, then use a demand curve
estimated for this group to value consumption changes
in the rest of the population.
Cutler and colleagues8 extend the approach of Jin
et al.45 to analyze issues of utility offsets to health beneﬁts
taking three groups into account: existing users who
reduce their consumption, potential new users deterred
from initiating, and continuing users and initiators who
may lose utility if the regulation increases the product
price or alters its attributes. Reﬂecting uncertainty about
how to identify people whose behavior is relatively close
to a rational, well-informed benchmark, they use two
alternative groups: smokers who do not meet criteria for
high nicotine dependence, whose smoking is presumably
more in line with their preferences than smokers who arewww.ajpmonline.org
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3045 years. The latter came of age after health risks of
smoking were relatively widely known, so they can be
taken to be relatively well informed; additionally, their
education can be expected to have developed their
abilities to process information about health risks, and
it correlates with having time and resources to make
decisions in forward-looking ways.46,47
For a hypothetical regulation that reduces cigarette
consumption by 10%, Cutler and colleagues8 show that
utility offsets to health beneﬁts are much smaller than
estimates used in recent beneﬁtcost analyses: For
existing users who quit, these are on the order of 5% if
most people who quit experience transitory utility losses
only, ranging up to 20% if some people experience
persistent losses. Because most regulations will induce
quitting among people for whom utility losses are
relatively small, they hypothesize that offsets will usually
be at the lower end of the range. The overall offset ratio
that aggregates over all users will depend on several
factors, including how deeply the regulation cuts into the
pool of existing smokers, how important deterred ini-
tiation is relative to quitting among existing users, and
whether the regulation increases the product’s price or
alters its attributes (thereby affecting continuing smok-
ers).19 But, in general, offset ratios are likely to be far
below the rates used in recent beneﬁtcost analyses.
The rational consumer approach has several advan-
tages over the other approaches. It is consistent with
welfare theoretic analysis, being rooted in standard
analysis of consumer surplus. Unlike the structural
approach, it allows for multiple departures from the
rational benchmark without requiring assumptions
about what these are. Its data requirements are less
stringent than with the other approaches, primarily
requiring information on product demand. The potential
difﬁculty of this approach is identifying consumers
whose consumption plausibly approximates a rational
benchmark. If there are important uncertainties in this
respect, using multiple possible benchmarks will help
ensure that the analysis is robust to plausible alternatives.
Conclusions
Appropriately measuring utility offsets is important for
analyzing the beneﬁts and costs of policies affecting addictive
and habitual goods. This paper describes the advantages and
limitations of several methods and their current use in
regulatory beneﬁtcost analysis. The paper identiﬁes the
rational benchmark approach as currently most tractable,
given available models and data. However, valuing beneﬁts
in the presence of gaps between preferences and behavior is
an area ripe for future research, both to improve theMay 2016foundation and precision of estimates using the rational
benchmark approach and to develop the other methods that
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